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Abstract. Computer systems have evolved from standalone systems,
over networked systems, to cyber-physical systems. In all stages, human
operators have been essential for the functioning of the system and for
understanding system messages. Recent trends make human actors an
even more central part of computer systems, resulting in what we call
“cyber-social systems”. In cyber-social systems, human actors and their
interaction with a system are essential for the state of the system and its
functioning. Both the system’s operation and the human’s operating it
are based on an assumption of each other’s behaviour. Consequently, an
assessment of the state of a system must take the human actors and these
interactions into account. However, human behaviour is difficult to model
at best. While socio-technical system models promise the inclusion of
human actors into a basis for system assessment, they lack the modelling
mechanisms for human behaviour. Existing behavioural models, on the
other side, mostly aim at explaining actions after an event. In this paper
we discuss, how behavioural models can be used to profile actor behaviour
either online or in simulations to understand the potential motivation
and to test hypotheses.
1 Introduction
In many computer systems, human actors and their interactions with the system
are essential for the state of the system and its functioning. Consequently, an
assessment of the state of a system must take the human actors and these in-
teractions into account. This need results from computer systems evolving from
standalone systems, over networked systems, to cyber-physical systems. In all
stages, human operators have been essential for the functioning of the system
and for understanding and interpreting system messages. These recent trends
make human actors an even more central part of computer systems, resulting in
what we call “cyber-social systems”.3
Explaining human behaviour is – in principle – easy: all we need is a con-
cise model of human behaviour that integrates dependencies on surroundings, a
precise surveillance system, and an evaluation system to draw conclusions from
3 As discussed in Section 3, we consider cyber-social systems at the system level,
opposed to Stanford University’s Cyber-Social Systems [24].
input. Of course, such a model and its components are neither “easy” to realise,
nor desirable, and many aspects depend on legal regulations. As a result, human
behaviour is difficult to model at best, be it at the societal or the individual
level. While socio-technical system models promise the inclusion of human ac-
tors into a basis for system assessment, they lack the modelling mechanisms for
human behaviour. Existing behavioural models, on the other side, mostly aim
at explaining actions after an event, for example, to help analysts understand
and explain, what has happened.
In this paper we discuss, how cyber-social systems can be represented as a
combination of socio-technical systems and behavioural models, and how they
can be used to profile actor behaviour. This profiling can be performed online
or in simulations to understand the potential motivation.
The rest of this article is structured as follows. The next section introduces
some background material about socio-technical systems, attack representations,
and behavioural models, followed by a discussion of cyber-social systems and
behavioural trees, which are our behavioural model, in Section 3. In Section 4
we discuss, how these systems can be used to perform behavioural profiling.
Finally, Section 5 concludes this article, and discusses future research directions.
2 Background
The work presented in this paper builds upon findings and developments in three
main areas: socio-technical system models, attack representations, and models
for explaining insider threats.
2.1 System Models
Recently, several system models have been introduced that inspire our work.
ExASyM [17,19], Portunes [3] and ANKH [15] models follow similar ideas - the
modelling of infrastructure and data, and analysing the modelled organisation
for possible threads. The semantics of both ExASyM and Portunes is formalised
using a variant of the Klaim family of process calculi [13]. However, Portunes
supports mobility of nodes, instead of processes, and represents the social domain
by low-level policies that describe the trust relation between people. The latter is
used to represent social engineering. In contrast to the above two models, ANKH
has a flat structure and the formal representation is a hyper-graph where the
hyper-edges represent containment. The modelling formalism heavily depends
on policies, which must be well defined in order to avoid unrealistic cases.
Pieters et al. consider policy alignment to address different levels of abstrac-
tion of socio-technical systems [16], where policies are interpreted as first-order
logical theories containing all sequences of actions (the behaviours) and express-
ing the policy as a “distinguished” prefix-closed predicate in these theories. In
contrast to their use of refinement for policies we use the security refinement
paradox, i.e., security is not generally preserved by refinement, in order to dis-
cover attacks.
2.2 Attack Representations
Attack trees [21,22] specify an attacker’s main goal (or a main security threat)
as the root of a tree; this goal is then disjunctively or conjunctively refined
into sub-goals. This refinement is repeated recursively, until the reached sub-
goals represent basic actions that correspond to atomic components. Disjunctive
refinements represent alternative ways of how a goal can be achieved, whereas
conjunctive refinements depict different steps an attacker needs to take in order
to achieve a goal [20,10]. Techniques for the automated generation of attack
graphs consider computer networks only [14,23], or general policies [7,8].
2.3 Behavioural Models
Legg et al. [12] address the complex and dynamic problem posed by insiders
against organisations. Their three-tier model incorporates a tier representing
the real world, a tier representing measurements or observables, and a tier repre-
senting hypotheses. The goal of the model is to support the analyst in detecting
potential insider threats. On the real world tier, a large set of elements exist
that correlate with insider threats, for example, activities, physical behaviour,
and psychological mindset. Since most of these elements can not be observed
directly, the analyst and the hypothesis tier must rely on measurements pro-
vided by the middle tier of the model. The confidence in observations made by
elements in this layer depends on how directly they are able to observe the real
world: the technical ones probably have high confidence in the associated values,
whereas the psychological and behavioural ones can only be observed indirectly
through a small set of indicators, and consequently provide a much lower level
of confidence.
System dynamics models represent complex systems in order to understand
their nonlinear behaviour. Models contain flow, feedback loops, and time delays,
and can model complex interaction between different actors. System dynamics
has been used to model and analyze the dynamic nature of the insider threat
problem [2,5], especially with focus on modelling human behaviour.
3 Cyber-Social Systems
Cyber-social systems result from cyber-physical systems by integrating human
actors into the system and the reasoning about it. Computer systems have
evolved from standalone systems, over networked systems, to cyber-physical sys-
tems. In all stages, human operators have been essential for the functioning of
the system and for understanding system messages. Recent trends make human
actors an even more central part of computer systems, resulting in what we call
“cyber-social systems”. As mentioned above, we consider cyber-social systems
at the level of the actual system and actors interacting with it. This comple-
ments the work by, e.g., the Stanford Cyber Initiative, which investigates how
cyber-technologies interact with existing social systems to understand cyber-
social systems [24].
In cyber-social systems, human actors and their interaction with a system
are essential for the state of the system and its functioning. On a societal level,
these may be influenced by markets, political systems, and policies. We are
interested in instances of such systems, and the processes at the system and
actor level. Decisions and behaviour at this level may be influenced by more
abstract concepts, but that is currently beyond the scope of our work.
To reason about cyber-social systems, we represent them as a combination
of a socio-technical system model, which represents the context of the system
being analysed, and a behavioural model for the human actors in that system.
Cyber-social systems thus enhance socio-technical systems with components for
the actors’ behaviour similar to approaches for externalizing behaviour in system
models [6]. The models for systems and behaviour are parameters of a cyber-
social system. Based on the application and the goal, these components can be
chosen as needed. In the remainder of this section, we briefly present candidates
for each of these.
It is important to note that the techniques described in this paper are
independent from the underlying models, similar to earlier developments by
Ivanova et al. [6]. Figure 1 shows their system model, which extends actors
with individual behaviour. The main contribution of the current work is the
development of behavioural trees and their embedding in cyber-social systems.
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Fig. 1. A system model structure with explicit behaviour and quantitative
data [6]. Together, these components form a cyber-social system, which is pa-
rameterised with the underlying system model and behavioural model.
3.1 The Socio-Technical System Model
The socio-technical system model is closely related to existing models [17,26]. It
is based on a process calculus that represents the three layers of socio-technical
models – the physical, the virtual, and the social layer – as parts of a graph-
based representation with processes for describing functionality at the virtual
and social layer.
The socio-technical system model represents the system infrastructure as
nodes in a directed graph [17], representing rooms, access control points, and
similar locations. Processes also represent actors and can possess data and items
that are relevant in the modelled scenario. Elements in the model can be an-
notated with values, e.g., the likelihood of being lost. Data and items can be
attached to locations or processes; those attached to processes move around
with that actor. Processes perform actions on locations, including physical loca-
tions or other processes. These actions are restricted by policies, which consist
of required credentials and enabled actions. Credentials represent the data or
assets an actor needs to provide in order to enable the actions in a policy, and
the enabled actions describe the gained rights by doing so [25]. Policies are used
both for access control and for organisational policies.
3.2 Behavioural Trees
Behavioural trees capture two components: they structure larger behavioural
patterns into sub-actions, and they include dependencies that represent how
the actor’s disposition towards certain actions changes based on events. A be-
havioural tree extends the embedding of behaviour in system models [6] by
encoding an analyst’s experience and strategy. In structure, behavioural trees
are similar to attack trees and attack templates [27].
Attack trees as described in Section 2.2 are a very flexible and loosely defined
tool to represent steps in possible attacks. Their success is to a large extent due
to their loose definition. Behavioural trees follow a similar strategy by offering
a simple structure for defining human behaviour and enabling factors. Just like
for attack trees, however, extensions will be needed to model, e.g., prohibiting
events, which could be represented similar to attack-defense trees [9].
Behavioural trees contain similar nodes as attack trees [1]:
– Disjunctive nodes represent options of which one must be present,
– Conjunctive nodes represent options, which all must be present, but may
appear in arbitrary order,
– Temporal disjunctive nodes represent options that are tried from left to right,
and of which one must be present, and
– Temporal conjunctive nodes represent options that must occur in that order
from left to right.
In attack trees, leafs usually describe basic actions, and inner nodes are mostly
used to label the “meaning” of the sub-tree rooted in these nodes. In behavioural
trees, both leafs and inner nodes describe actions, events, and decisions taken
by an actor. Both leafs and inner nodes may also be part of one or more system
dynamics overlays, which describe, how the events and actions of the actor or
the environment influence the actor’s behaviour and disposition towards certain
behaviour.
Figure 2 shows an example for a behavioural tree that represents two possible
actions: stealing an asset and going to a competitor, which both are influenced
by parts of the system dynamics overlay [2]. The node with the double frame
represents a temporal conjunctive node: in order to steal an asset, the actor
must first have the desire to steal, and then get the chance. The dashed lines
connect nodes in the behavioural tree, the solid arrows connect nodes in the
system dynamics model, and describe direct or opposite changes in the value
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Fig. 2. An example for a behavioural tree that represents two possible actions:
stealing an asset and going to a competitor, which both are influenced by parts
of the system dynamics overlay [2]. The dashed lines connect nodes in the be-
havioural tree, the solid arrows connect nodes in the system dynamics model,
and describe direct or opposite changes in the value of the target node based
on changes at the source node. The node with the double frame represents a
temporal conjunctive node.
of the target node based on changes at the source node. Nodes may be part of
either the behavioural tree, the system dynamics model, or both.
It is noteworthy that the changes induced to one node in the system dynamics
model based on changes at another node do not need to be constant, but can
vary based on time, the current value, or other factors influenced by the overall
state of the system. Also, the threshold at which the action at a node is enabled
is usually not binary, but changes continuously.
Behavioural trees need not and cannot be complete, since it is impossible to
predict all aspects of human behaviour, its dependencies on inside and outside
events, and the relevant events influencing behaviour. However, some of the
quantitative measures can be initiated based on personality testing and lifestyle
polygraphs, as are often performed as part of job interviews.
Furthermore, parts of the behavioural trees are similar for all actors, proba-
bly with different factors, and thus can be shared across populations. Further-
more, behavioural trees can be extended during the behavioural profiling with
newly observed actions. While these actions initially do not have quantitative
properties, they can be initialised with heuristic values to feed the analysis and
simulation, which in turn will refine the initial values to more sensible ones.
4 Behavioural Profiling
Legg et al. [12] discuss two applications of their model: bottom-up and top-down,
where the top tier is the hypothesis, as described above, and the bottom layer
is the real world.
Based on direct observations (measurements) of the real world, bottom-up
reasoning begins with making indirect observations, for example, based on sta-
tistical profiles for each individual, and profiles capturing their traits and be-
haviours. These indirect observations then feed into hypotheses, which are the
building blocks for the analyst to formulate more complex hypotheses, trigger-
ing alerts, for example, if the collected measurements of an indicator exceed the
expected values [12].
On the other hand, top-down reasoning begins from a concrete concern, for
example based on input from a whistle blower or from a trigger-based alert from
the bottom-up analysis. In this case, the analyst will formulate a hypothesis, and
the model would attempt to “fulfil” this assumption given possible observations
from the measurement tier.
In this section we describe how behavioural trees can be applied to model
this workflow in automatic analyses in two different cases: the backward-looking
analysis explaining observed events, and the forward-looking analysis predicting
future events. Finally, we discuss methods for refining the values in behavioural
trees by combining these two analyses, and how to refine values through statis-
tical model checking.
All analyses described in the following can be applied in general on a popula-
tion of actors, in which case they result in conditions that potential actors must
fulfil, or on a specific actor, in which case they confirm or invalidate a hypothesis
with respect to that actor.
4.1 Explaining Past Behaviour
Explaining past behaviour is equivalent to the top-down reasoning described
above. In this setting, the analyst has a concern and tries to understand, what
happened and how, and which observations to look out for.
In this application scenario, behavioural trees are traversed top down, from
behaviour to actions. At transitions to the system dynamics model, this part is
explored backwards. This exploration provides the analysis with possible reasons,
why a certain action was performed, and with events that can be expected to
have occurred. At transitions to the behavioural tree, the top down exploration
continues from the nodes that are triggered by the system dynamics model.
In the tree in Figure 2, for example, if the theft of an asset has been observed,
the analysis will identify the desire to steal and the chance to steal as necessary
pre-conditions. The desire is influenced positively by the actor’s dissatisfaction
and an intent to go to a competitor, but negatively by a possible salary raise.
4.2 Predicting Future Behaviour
Predicting future behaviour is equivalent to bottom-up reasoning, which builds
hypotheses that the analyst can use to setup surveillance mechanisms.
As before, also in this application scenario we traverse behavioural trees
top down, but with a different goal: now we aim at identifying the actions and
events to look out for, and possibly also actors who are likely to perform these
actions or trigger these events. The system dynamics model is now explored in
both directions: backward to identify possible reasons and triggering events for
actions, and forward to identify possible followup events and actions to lookout
for. The backward events must be handled with care, since some of them are
likely to have occurred before the analysis started; this must be accounted for
in the reasoning.
In the behavioural tree presented in Figure 2, for example, the type of as-
set defines the applicable actions for obtaining it, e.g., logging in remotely, the
use of flash drives, or emails. The analysis may use this information to suggest
where to set up surveillance mechanisms to alert a human operator or online
surveillance mechanisms [18]. Especially the notification of the organisation is
promising, since many events influencing behaviour are difficult to formalise and
measure, e.g., that an actor might be on the verge of leaving the organisation.
4.3 Combining Past and Future
Executing either of the two analyses described above after the other, as well as
iterations alternating between the two phases, is beneficial to understanding and
profiling behaviour:
– Results of an analysis of past behaviour provide the analysis with input to
make better predictions of the future behaviour, and similarly,
– Results of an analysis of future behaviour, that is which events and actions
to look out for, guide the analysis of past events towards those parts of the
behavioural tree that may influence this future behaviour.
Typically, we expect several changes of direction in such an analysis: based on
results for the future, the analysis of the past is refined, and vice versa, providing
more input for explaining future events, or extending the possible set of future
events and trying to identify more supporting data from the past.
Another dimension are combinations of behavioural trees for different actors,
which extend the search space for possible motivations. Also here, the observed
past events or identified future events help the analysis to limit exploration to
those actors that potentially may perform the actions or perform relevant actions
that may influence the behaviour of an actor under scrutiny.
4.4 Refining Values
As mentioned before, precise models of human behaviour cannot be built, and
consequently behavioural trees are incomplete and the values and factors in the
trees will not be precise. However, behavioural trees describe possible behaviour
of actors, and as such can be used together with the socio-technical system model
for simulations of this behaviour in statistical model checking [11].
Simulations through statistical model checking provide the behavioural pro-
filing of cyber-social systems, and they provide the means to verify computed
and observed likelihoods of actions and events. The simulation applies the anal-
ysis results for past behaviour to future behaviour, by simulating the behaviour
of actors. This simulated behaviour can be predetermined, randomised, or follow
more involved strategies [6].
5 Conclusion and Future Work
In this article, we have described how to perform behavioural profiling for cyber-
social systems, which combine socio-technical systems and behavioural trees.
Cyber-social systems are the next step in integration of computer systems by
making human actors an even more central part of these systems, which have
evolved from standalone systems, over networked systems, to cyber-physical sys-
tems. In all stages, human operators have been essential for the functioning of
the system and for understanding system messages. Now, human actors and
their interaction with a system are essential for the state of the system and
its functioning. Both the system’s operation and the human’s operating it are
based on an assumption of each other’s behaviour. Consequently, an assessment
of the state of a system must take the human actors and these interactions into
account.
Behavioural profiling based on a combination of behavioural trees and socio-
technical system models promises the simulation of analysts’ workflows [12], and
the verification of results using statistical model checking. Behavioural trees are
by definition incomplete, but can be extended during the analysis with newly ob-
served actions. While these actions initially do not have quantitative properties,
they can be initialised with heuristic values to feed the analysis and simulation,
which will refine them to more sensible values.
We are currently working on a theory for cyber-social systems and their ap-
plication to behavioural profiling. This involves refining behavioural trees and
relevant properties, as well as heuristics for choosing new actions and events to
add to the tree. Especially psycho-analytical based profiling models, as well as
studying personality traits, are interesting to benchmark and refine the profil-
ing in cyber-social systems. In automated approaches it is in general impossible
to observe the context and circumstances that dictate and predict criminal be-
haviour, let alone to understand them. However, there are many similarities be-
tween Weber’s sociological explanation of the social situation and the collective
explanandum [4], and abstraction and realisation applied in the computation of
fix points in formal methods.
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